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The subject of trusts, even in the particular area of income tax, 
is vast. Therefore, it is important that I discuss from the 
outset the outline of my approach in order to give my treatment 
of the subject under consideration form and direction. And that 
is what I propose to do briefly here. 
The discussion consists of five parts. The first of these is the 
Background which includes definitions and an historical note 
which I consider to be necessary in view of the largely common 
law - as opposed to a codified magnus opus 1 - basis of South 
African law of trusts, where 
"Other statutes are superimposed, like a ship upon the 
water, on the common law without replacing it .... 112 , 
The second part also has some historical element, but this is 
limited to the Taxability of Trusts, qua trusts or legal 
personae, in income tax law; while the third deals with kinds of 
Trusts and Their significance. The fourth looks at Income Tax 
Avoidance Opportunities while the last considers Anti-Avoidance 
Provisions of the Act 3 Relevant to Trusts, interspersed with one 
or two examples of schemes not only immune to the specific anti-
• avoidance provisions of Section 7 but probably also to the 
general anti-avoidance provisions of Section 103 (1). 




Hahlo and Kahn 67 
ibid. 70 
Unless the context indicates otherwise, Act shail mean 




The trust institution is of English law origin dating from the 
11th century4 • It was accepted de facto into South African law 
with the arrival of the British at the Cape. De jure there was 
no wholesale reception by way of legislation; instead 
"there was a cautious acceptance, subject to 
reconciliation with Roman-Dutch doctrinal frame-work 
(and minimal 5 legislation in specific areas)". 
It was in the light of such cautious acceptance and absence of 
wholesale legislative reception that Hahlo observed some forty 
years ago that: 
"when it comes to trusts in our law, even the most 
elementary propositions cannot be regarded as settled. 
It will take the work of several generations of judges 
and text-writers before our law of trusts reaches 
maturity6 ". 
This has proved to be true, for, as recently as 1991 one such 
unsettled proposition was the taxability of the trust as a person 
in terms of the provisions of the Act . 
the institution of Initially, acceptance of 
African courts was at times on the basis 
instead of accepting "doctrinal frame-work" 
trust 7 by South 
of Roman-Dutch 
it as a foreign 
institution altogether. For instance the testamentary trust was 







Hahlo 1952 Salj 349 
see Corbettet al 403 and infra 
Estate Kemp V McDonald's Trustee 
• 
3 
the inter vivos trust was explained as stipulatio alteri 9 • 
However, the trust is now accepted as an institution sui generis 
without Roman-Dutch antecedents. 
The Act defines trust as : any trust fund consisting of cash or 
other assets which are administered and controlled by a person 
acting in a fiduciary capacity where such person is appointed 
under a deed of trust or by agreement or under the will of a 
deceased person. 
In my opinion, with respect, a more useful definition is that 
given by the Trust Property Control Act No. 57 of 1988 which 
defines trust as : 
" The arrangement through 
property of one person is 
\ 
I 
which the ownership of 
by virtue of a trust 
instrument made over or bequeathed to another person, 
the trustee, to be administered for the benefit of 
another, the beneficiary, but does not 
case where the property of another 
include the 
is to be 
administered by any person as executor, tutor or 
curator or in terms of the provisions of the 
Administration of Estates Act 1965". 
The essential features of the trust emerge clearly from the 
definition and these are firstly that, the ownership and control 
of the property are separated from the beneficial enjoyment 
thereof; and secondly, there are the original owner of the 
property, called the donor or settlor (or testator in the case 
of a testamentary trust), the trustee and the beneficiary. The 
separation of dominium from beneficial enjoyment and the 
interrelationships among the various subjects involved in the 
trust, give rise to the problem as to who of the donor, trustee 
and beneficiary is liable to tax on the income arising from the 
trust. This problem will be considered at length below in 
9 CIR V Estate Crewe 
• 
4 
relation to vesting and anti-avoidance provisions. But before 
that I shall look at the taxability of trusts as such. 
1. 
2. 
B. TAXABILITY OF TRUSTS 
REVENUE DEPARTMENTAL PRACTICE 
Before the provisions of the Income Tax Act were amended in 
1991 in anticipation of the Phillip Frame Trust decision, 
the Revenue Department taxed trusts as unmarried persons as 
a matter of course - the same way as it had taxed deceased 
estates until the cases Estate Smith and Emary were 
decided. The latter two cases brought about a change in 
the law regarding the taxability of deceased estates. 
In Estate Smith and Emary it was held that a deceased 
estate is not a person and therefore not taxable. In 
response the Act was amended to reverse the effects of the 
decisions by expressly providing for the definition of 
person to include a deceased estate. 
It is remarkable, however, that the Revenue practice of 
taxing trusts as unmarried persons remained unchallenged 
for so long - even after the amendment of the Act to 
include deceased estate in the definition of person 
pointedly omitted to include trust in such definition. 
CHARGING SECTION 
The charging section of the Act is section 5 ( 1) which 
provides for the annual payment of an income tax in respect 
of taxable income received by or accrued or in favour of 
any person or company during the year of assessment. So, 
unless an entity is a person either at common law or .as 
defined in the Act, or is a company in terms of the 
Companies Act 1973, it will not be liable to income tax. 
• 
5 
The question arises, is a trust a person? And that was the 
question for decision in the Phillip Frame Trust case where 
the court held that a trust was not a person for the 
purposes of the Income Tax Act. This decision was 
anticipated by Jooste who wrote in 1987 that there was 
" ... ample authority that a trust is not a legal 
persona in terms of the common law and it is contended 
that Emary's case and Mac Neillies case have put paid 
to any argument that a trust is a person in terms of 
the Interpretation Act 1110 • 
However, other writers are in agreement with neither Jooste 
nor with the Phillip Frame Trust decision. Nevertheless, 
it being unnecessary to pursue the matter any farther, 
suffice it to say that the definition of person in the Act 
was subsequently amended in 1991 with effect from 1st March 
1986 to read as follows: 
"person includes the estate of a deceased person and 
any trust fund consisting of cash or other assets 
which are administered and controlled in a fiduciary 
capacity, where such person is appointed under a deed 
of trust or by agreement or under the will of a 
deceased person". 
Strictly speaking what I have said about the taxability of 
trusts qua trusts is part of the historical background 
because statute has long since settled the matter. 
However, I consider it important enough to warrant special 
treatment. Now I go on to consider the main issues in the 
taxation of trusts in general, beginning with an outline of 
the various types of trusts and their consequences. 
10 Jooste 130 
6 
C KINDS OF TRUSTS 
The importance of distinguishing types of trusts l~es in the fact 
that the tax implications of a trust depend in many cases on 
whether it is a trust of one kind or another. Trusts are 
differentiated in two ways in terms of whether they are inter 
vivos or testamentary trusts or whether they are vesting or 
discretionary trusts. However, they may also be classified as 
either trading trusts or charitable trusts. 
A testamentary trust is constituted when a testator bequeaths 
property to the trustee or administrator with an instruction to 
administer it for the benefit of another person or other persons 
appointed by the will 11; while an inter vi vos trust involves 
effecting such gift over by the donor or settler during his life 
time. 
However a more important distinction for our purposes is that 
between a discretionary and a vesting trust which could either 
be testamentary or inter vivos, depending on the liberality or 
otherwise of the donor or testator. Indeed, 
"The trust accommodates the 
posthumous, and the liberal. 
autocrat, present and 
(The) founder may give 
the beneficiaries fixed rights or may by setting up a 
discretionary trust allow the trustee a wide 
discretion to give or to withhold benefits .... 1112 
The trust which gives beneficiaries what Honore calls fixed 
rights is called a vesting or non-discretionary trust, while the 
"variable" one is called a discretionary trust. And seeing that 
the term "Vesting" is central to the distinction between 
discretionary and non-discretionary (Vesting) trust, I shall 
briefly attempt to define it and thereafter consider the income 
11 see note 7 above. 
12 Honore 14 
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tax implications of discretionary and vesting trusts. 
1. VESTING 
There are two meanings of "vesting" or "vested" that are 
relevant to the discussion. 13 
1.1 A right is said to be vested in a person when he owns 
it and he "has all the rights of enjoyment". 14 
However, property may vest in someone purely for 
purposes of administration without the right of 
enjoyment. An example of this is when property vests 
in a trustee while the right of enjoyment accrues to 
the beneficiary. That is the basis of the institution 
of trust. 
1.2 A second sense of the term denotes what is certain, as 
in "vested right" (real or personal) as opposed to 
contingent or conditional right. This is the sense in 
which "vesting" or "vested" is used in the context 6f 
vesting and discretionary trusts. 
However, it is important to note that while income may both 
vest and accrue to the same person, it is possib~e for 
vesting and accrual or enjoyment to happen at different 
dates, dies cedit and dies venit. 
2. VESTING OR NON-DISCRETIONARY TRUST 
You have a vesting trust when the income of the trust vests 
in the beneficiaries whether it is paid to them or not. An 
example of such trust could be where the deed of trust 
provides that the trustees shall pay to the beneficiaries 
·' 
13 Honore ibid 471 
14 Jewish Colonial Trust case 175 
all income as and when it accrues to the trust. 
8 
In that 
case the income vests in the beneficiaries on the date it 
accrues to or is received by the trust even if the actual 
payment to the beneficiaries - and thus enjoyment by them -
will take place only on a later date. 
Thus if we recall the three possibilities for liability for 
tax mentioned under A above, ie whether the income 
concerned will be taxed in the hands of the trust (T) or 
donor (D) or beneficiary (B), we see that in the case of a 
vesting trust, in the normal course of events, only B will 
be taxed. However where Bis a minor child of D, section 
7 (3) will intervene and D will be taxed15 • 
3 DISCRETIONARY TRUST 
Suppose there are two deeds of trust, the first providing 
that the income of the trust shall accrue to the 
beneficiaries but the trustees shall have a discretion as 
to whether, and how, to invest the income for the benefit 
of the beneficiaries or to pay it to them. The second 
provides that it is up to the trustees to decide whether or 
not to pay the income to the beneficiaries or to somebody 
else. The two are both examples of discretionary trusts 
with one crucial difference. The first example involves a 
vested right even if enjoyment is restricted and thus, 
strictly speaking, is a vesting trust (or paradoxically a 
non-discretionary trust) . The second trust involves a 
right contingent upon the trustees' decision. It is 
precisely that contingency that determines a truly 
discretionary trust. See C supra16 • 
The general tax position is that in the case of a 
discretionary trust (discretionary in the restricted 
15 see E5.2 Infra 




sense), the trust as such will be liable where there has 
not been a distribution to the beneficiaries and the donor 
is not alive. And where there has not been a distribution 
and the donor is alive, the latter may be liable in terms 
of section 7(5) considered below. Lastly, where there has 
been a distribution to beneficiaries, the beneficiaries 
themselves will be liable subject to the provisions of 
section 7(3). 
THE CONDUIT-PIPE PRINCIPLE 
It is appropriate at this point to consider the above. One 
of the most important principles in the law of trusts and 
one typical of vesting trusts is what is called the 
conduit-pipe principle which states that, income passing 
through a trust retains its identity, the trust merely 
being a conduit-pipe through which the income flows. See 
the cases Armstrong and Rosen. In the former case, 
Stratford C.J. held: 
"In the simple case ... of a trio comprising a company, 
the intervening trustee, and the beneficiary, it is 
manifest that in the truest sense the beneficiary 
derives his income from the company, for that income 
fluctuates with the fortunes of the company and the 
trustee can neither increase nor diminish it, he is a 
mere conduit-pipe" 17 • 
It is clear from this judgement that the principle is of 
particular relevance to vesting trusts and not necessarily 
so to discretionary trusts. This view was confirmed obiter 
by Trollip J.A. 
"The trust deed may ... entitle or oblige the trustee 
to administer the dividends in such a way that he is 
17 and Honore 473 as to nature of discretion 
C 
5. 
not a mere conduit-pipe for passing them on to the 
beneficiary, that in his hands their source as 
dividends can no longer be identified or they 
otherwise lose their character and identity as 
dividends, and that the beneficiary is thus entitled 
to receive mere trust income in contradistinction to 
the benefit of the dividend rights in terms of the 
above crucial phrase" 18 
10 
In other words a discretionary trust may be treated as the 
fans et origo of the income instead of being the conduit-
pipe linking the beneficiary to the originating cause. 
The example given by Trollip J A in the Rosen decision of 
loss of character and identity of dividend income where the 
trustee is not a mere conduit-pipe, is of particular 
importance for tax planning. 
In view of the fact that dividends are exempt from income 
tax ( "normal tax") in terms of section 10 (1) (K), the 
taxpayer who received dividend income via a trust would 
prefer the conduit-pipe principle to apply in his case and 
would thus prefer that a vesting trust rather than a 
discretionary trust be set up for the purpose. 
RECAPITULATION 
Using trust income as a vested · or contingent right of 
beneficiary, the essentials discussed under part C so far 
may be summarised schematically as follows: 




a vested right a non-vested or 
contingent right 
vesting trust discretionary trust 
I 
income awarded not awarded 
vested right not vested 
beneficiary taxed beneficiary taxed trust taxed 




Regarding the taxation of the beneficiary when income has vested 
in him and that of the trust when there has been no vesting in 
the beneficiary, bearing in mind the problem introduced by the 
Phillip Frame Trust case (see B above), the legislature has gone 
farther and enacted Section 25B to put the matter beyond doubt 19 
and some. 
19 
Naturally, I now look at Section 25B. 
By specifically providing for the taxation of the 
trust as illustrated in the schema instead of merely 
providing for the definition of "person" to include 




6. SECTION 25B 
6.1 The first of three subsections is section 25B(l) which 
provides that, any income received by or accrued to or 
in favour of any person in his capacity as a trustee 
of a trust fund shall, subject to section 7, to the 
extent that it has been derived for the immediate or 
future benefit of an ascertained beneficiary with a 
vested right, be deemed to be income accrued to the 
beneficiary, otherwise be deemed to be income of the 
trust fund. 
The subsection is self-explanatory and is in accordance 
with the schema under C5 above. Nothing more needs to be 
said about it. 
6.2 The second is section 25B(2) which provides that, 
where the beneficiary has acquired a vested right in 
consequence of the exercise by the trustee of a 
discretion vested in him by the trust deed, such 
income is deemed to be derived for the benefit of the 
beneficiary. 
The provisions of this subsection too are illustrated 
in the above schema-in particular by the left hand 
side sub-branch. 
6.3 Section 25B(3) provides that, any deduction or 
allowance which may be made under the Act in 
calculating the taxable income and which relates to 
the income which has accrued to a beneficiary or to 
the trust fund, is deemed to be a deduction which is 
permitted in the hands of the person who is deemed to 
have derived the income, to the extent to which the 
income is deemed to accrue to the beneficiary or to 




There are two possible interpretations of the 
underlined part of the subsection. The~first is that 
deductions will not be allowed to exceed income. In 
other words there can be no assessed loss. Obviously 
this is an unlikely interpretation as it is contrary 
to the provisions of section 20(1) of the Act 
regarding assessed losses. 
The second, and more likely interpretation, is that 
the subsection provides for the apportionment of the 
expenditure between the beneficiary and the trust on 
the basis of the ratio of the respective incomes to 
total income. However, this interpretation is not 
without problems since it gives not just a different, 
but also an anomalous 20 , result from that prior to the 
introduction of the subsection as the following 
example will show. 
Example 
Consider a trust with income Rl00 000 and expenditure 
R40 000. If the trust distributed R60 000 to the 
beneficiary, the position prior to section 25B (3) 




Taxable income of trust 
Taxable income of beneficiary 









The effect of section 25B(3) is as follows. 
Taxable income of trust: 
Income RlOO 000 
Distribution (40 000) 
Exp. 40 000 X 40 000 
1 100 000 (16 000) 
Taxable income R 24 000 
--------
Taxable income of beneficiary: 
Income R 60 000 
Exp. 40 000 x 60 000 (24 000) 
Taxable income R 36 000 
--------
7. ANOMALOUS EFFECT OF SECTION 25B 
14 
The effect of the section in the example given above is to 
decrease the taxable income of the beneficiary by R24 000 
while increasing that of the trust from zero by the same 
amount. As far as this particular result is concerned, the 
ficus is the loser in those cases (probably the majority) 
where the trust's marginal rate of tax is lower than the 
beneficiary's. However, that is not the point. The point 
is that the trust, having distributed all its net income to 
the beneficiary, now has to pay tax which under the 
circumstances it can pay only out of capital. There lies 
the anomaly which Professor Emslie discusses extensively 
and gives possible solutions in his article21 • 
7.1 One obvious "solution" is for the trustees to pay the 
beneficiary what has vested in him less a 
proportionate share of the expenditure. 
21 Ibid 
This works out as follows. 
Income of trust 
Expenditure 
Income vested in B 60 000 
Proportionate exp. 60 000 x 40 000 (24 000) 
100 000 
Payable to Band taxable in his hands 







However there is a question. Is it that obvious that the 
income referred to in section 25B(l) as having been 
"derived for the immediate or future benefit of an 
ascertained beneficiary" refers to the R60 000 and not R36 
000 in our example? The answer is that it is not obvious 
and this could lead to problems. 
proposed solution. 
I now come to Emslie's 
7. 2 According to Professor Emslie the solution lies in 
construing the words "has been derived for the 
immediate or future benefit of an ascertained 
beneficiary". 
"As requiring the hypothesis that but for the 
expenditure and allowances, contemplated in section 
25B(3) the 'income' would be so derived" 22 • 
Adoption of this construction would simply restore the 
status quo aute as follows. 
22 
Gross income of trust 
Less exempt income 
Rl00 000 
"Income" derived for benefit of B 100 000 
Less deductible expenditure (40 0.00) 
Taxable income of B R 60 000 
----------------
Emslie Ioc. cit., referring to the total income of 
Rl00,000. 
16 
This construction also results in the beneficiary being 
entitled to claim the deduction of a revenue loss sustained 
by the trust as in the following example. 
Gross income of trust 
Less exempt income 
"Income" derived for benefit of B 
Less expenditure, say, 




R 20 000 
--------
The anomaly discussed thus far is in respect of a vested 
trust where, as we have seen above, the trustee is a mere 
conduit-pipe passing the income from its originating cause 
to the beneficiary. As you can imagine, a discretionary 
trust presents a more intractable problem. And Professor 
Emslie readily admits that the construction of section 
25B{3) proposed by him in respect of trust income which has 
vested in the beneficiary "does not easily fall into place 
in the case of a discretionary trust". (Emslie 230). 
Indeed, if the income of the trust is Rl00 000, its net 
income is R60 000 and the trustee exercises his discretion 
to vest R60 000 or Rl0 000 in the beneficiary, what is the 
proportion of the expenditure and allowances relating to 
the "income" of the trust which the beneficiary is entitled 
to deduct under the section? 
In the case of a vested trust it is a simple matter, as we 
have seen above, to assume that but for the trust's 
expenditure the whole of the Rl00 000 would have vested in 
the beneficiary. But can we extrapolate and say that 
because the trustee exercised his discretion to vest the 
whole of the trust's net income or Rl0 000 in the 
beneficiary, therefore the whole or one-sixth of the 
trust's "income" vested in the beneficiary? The same 
question is posed by Professor Emslie and his answer is 
that it is doubtful whether such an assumption can be made 
• 
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but then, ",,, if it is not made there would, in the case 
of a discretionary trust, be the same extraordinary result 
we postulated earlier in the case of a vested interest 11 • 
(Loe. cit.) 
All this clearly indicates that the legislature must step 
in to remove the anomalous consequences of Section 25B (3) 
before there can be certainty in the application of its 
provisions. On that note we end our general discussion of 
trusts and move on to specific cases, starting with tax 
avoidance opportunities presented by various sections of 
the Income Tax Act. 
D TAX AVOIDANCE OPPORTUNITIES 
"It is trite law that His Majesty's subjects are free, 
if they can, to make their own arrangements so that 
their cases may fall outside the scope of the Taxing 
Acts. They incur no legal penalties and, strictly 
speaking, no moral censure if, having considered the 
lines drawn by the legislature for the imposition of 
taxes, they make it their business to walk outside 
them23 " • 
That is the essence of tax avoidance as opposed to fraudulent tax 
evasion. And there are many instances where taxpayers can 
legitimately and legally make such arrangements, through the use 
of trusts, as will enable "their cases to fall outside the scope 
of the Act". The trust institution may be used in this 
connection either to avoid the burdensome effects or to take 
advantage of such provisions of the Income Tax Act as sections 
41 and 42 on NRST; section 22(1) on shares as trading stock; and 
section 20(1) and (2A) on assessed losses. Below I look at each 
of these in turn. 
23 Viscount Summer in Levene V IRC at 227 
1 
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NON-RESIDENT SHAREHOLDERS' TAX 
In terms of section 42(1) non-resident shareholders' tax on 
dividends is payable in respect of dividends payable to: a 
person not ordinarily resident nor carrying on business in 
the Republic; a deceased estate of such person; a company 
which is not a South African Company. These provisions make 
possible the avoidance of NRST as shown below 
Example 
Suppose Taxpayer is a non-resident and is not carrying on 
business in the Republic. Suppose also that he is in 
receipt of, or is due to receive, Rl0 000 dividend from a 
South African Company. His position will be as follows: 
Dividend 
Withholding tax 15% (section 45) 
Balance due to T 
Rl0 000 
1 500 
R 8 500 
-------
If, however, T forms a discretionary trust in the Republic 
which becomes the shareholder and recipient of the 
dividend, and the trustee distributes the dividend to T 
long after the end of the tax year, there will be a tax 
saving as t"ollows: 
1.1 The dividend will not vest in T immediately it is 
declared and paid into the trust. So Twill not be 
liable to NRST. 
1.2 The trust is not a non-resident person because it was 
formed in the Republic. Therefore it will not be 
liable to NRST on the dividend accruing to it. 
1.3 It will also not be liable to income tax as dividends 
are exempt in terms of section 10 (1) (K) . 
2. 
19 
1.4 The result will be a saving of Rl 500. 
SHARES AS TRADING STOCK 
Section 22(1) provides that, except for shares held by a 
company as trading stock, the amount which shall be taken 
into account in respect of the value of any trading stock 
held and not disposed of shall be the cost price or net 
realisable value of such trading stock. 
Example 
Suppose there are two sharedealing taxpayers, company C and· 
Trust T. Suppose also that during year 1, their first year 
of trading, they each purchase a stock of shares for R50 
000 and that they each sell 50% of their shares for R50 
000. Assume further that at the end of the tax year the 
remaining shares have become worthless. 
The effect of section 22(1) on their respective tax 






















The advantage of the trust is obvious in this example. At 
the end of year 1 the company will be taxed on R25 000 
while the trust will be taxed on nothing. The advantage of 
the trust remains even if "disadvantageous" closing stock 
of R25 000 of year 1 of the company will be the 
"advantageous" opening stock of R25 000 in year 2 in terms 
of section 22(2) (a); for a rand in the hand is worth more 
than a rand in the future taking into account inflation and 
present value and interest considerations. 
It must be noted however that t~e same result could be 
achieved with an individual taxpayer or a partnership as 
with a trust. 
3. ASSESSED LOSSES 
Section 20 (1) provides for set-off against income from 
trade of any balance of assessed loss from any previous 
year (subject to certain provisos) and any assessed loss 
incurred during the same year in carrying on any other 
trade. 
The provision for set-off of any balance of assessed loss 
against income from trade has been interpreted as applying 
only if there has been trading during the tax year. 
" A deduction or set-off is admissible only against 
income derived from carrying on a trade. As the 
appellant carried on no trade during the year under 
consideration it was not competent for it to set-off 
in its income tax return for that year the balance of 
assessed loss incurred by it in previous years". 24 
It must be noted, however, that apart from the requirement 
of continuity of operations as required by the S.A. Bazaars 
24 S.A. Bazaars (Pty) Ltd V CIR at 245 
• 
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decision the "trade" concerned must fall within the 
definition of section 1 which does not for instance include 
the earning of interest. Hence the importance of 
subsection (2A) (a) of section 20 in respect of non-company 
taxpayers. 
Subsection (2A) (a) and (b) provides that in the case of a 
taxpayer other than a company, subsection (1) of section 20 
will apply in determining the taxable income derived 
otherwise than by carrying on a trade; and that such non-
company taxpayer shall not be prevented from carrying 
forward a balance of assessed loss merely by reason of the 
fact that he has not derived any income during the year of 
assessment. 
In short, to obviate the problem created by section 20(1) 
in the light of the S .A. · Bazaar decision, and to take 
advantage of the opportunities created by section (2A), one 
would be well advised to form a trust which would be able 
to do the following~-
3.1 To carry forward assessed losses from previous years 
even if it did not trade during the year. 
3.2 To set-off trade losses against non-trade income . 
4. AVOIDANCE BY" SKIRTING" AND BY "SCHEME" 
All the above examples are avoidance opportunities 
involving, to paraphrase Levene25 , walking outside the 
lines drawn by statute through employment of the trust 
institution as opposed to operating either as an individual 
or through a company. This particular type of avoidance is 
in my opinion pedestrian or perfectly acceptable to the 
taxman. Other forms of avoidance involve not so much the 
25 Supra 
22 
employment of "taxpayer friendly" forms of business 
enterprise to circumvent or "skirt" tax pitfalls as the 
carrying out of "abnormal" "transactions, operations or 
schemes "26 whose object and ef feet is the avoidance of tax. 
Such schemes are proscribed by the general anti-avoidance 
provisions of section 103(1) and the trust-specific anti-
avoidance provisions of section 7. The latter provisions 
will be considered at some length below, while the former, 
being of more general application, merit no further 
consideration. 
E TRUST-SPECIFIC ANTI-AVOIDANCE PROVISIONS 
1. GENERAL 
As a variant of the Levene27 theme, I would like to quote 
Broomberg: 
"Most people, at the best of times, dislike paying 
tax; but nothing infuriates them more than the 
knowledge that others, in like circumstances, are 
honestly and legitimately paying less tax" 28 • 
And if any group of taxpayers should dislike paying tax 
more than any other, it must be high-income individual 
persons whose income tax position is worsened by 
progressive rates of tax exacerbated by conditions of high 
inflation - a combination of what are called bracket creep 










Consider unmarried taxpayers P,Q,R, and S with respective 
taxable incomes of R20,000, R35,000, R40,000 and R60,000. 
Suppose each receives an extra income of Rl000. Their net 






























In the circumstances there will be great pressure on the 
taxpayer, especially Rand Sin the example, to seek to 
"forego" any extra income by converting it into income 
accruing to some dependent or other who will be either 
exempt from tax or will have a low marginal rate of tax. 
Creation of a trust would be one way of achieving this -
spreading the incidence of tax to minimise the overall tax 
burden. He may also attempt to use the trust to postpone 
the payment of tax on the principle that tax deferred is 
tax saved; or he may seek to retain control of the trust 
assets so that he will always be able to decide, in 
accordance with his own tax position, as to who should be 
paid as beneficiary and how much. 
Below I will look at such "elaborate avoidance by scheme" 
possibilities hinted at under D above and the specific 
anti-avoidance provisions of the Income Tax Act designed to 
counter them. However, before proceeding I briefly want to 
map out how I propose to tackle the rest of part E. 
Firstly, I want to bring donations tax into the picture as 
an anti-avoidance measure in its own right. Secondly, I 
24 
will give an example around which most anti-avoidance 
measures will be considered, starting with the effects of 
donations tax and how these may themselves be avoided. 
Lastly, I will look at specific provisions of section 7 and 
the relevant case law. 
2. DONATIONS TAX 
Donations tax, while it is more concerned with countering 
estate duty avoidance than income tax avoidance, is 
nevertheless relevant as an anti-avoidance measure in the 
taxation of trusts because many trusts have donations back 
of them. It is not a tax on income but a tax on the net 
transfer of assets. Nevertheless it is an important link 
in the chain. It serves to discourage the setting up of 
trusts for the purpose of avoiding income tax. 
11 It imposes a tax on persons who may want to donate 
their assets in·order to avoid normal tax (and) estate 
duty"29 
It is not my intention to say more about the tax except to 
refer to two sections of the Income Tax Act which are: 
2.1 Section 55(1) which defines donation as any gratuitous 
waiver or renunciation of a right; and 
2.2 Section 64 which provides that the rate of donations 
tax in respect of the value of any property disposed 
of under a donation shall be 15% of such value. 
3. ILLUSTRATION 
Having given the barest outline of donations tax, I now 
proceed with the discussion by starting off with an example 
29 Huxham and Haupt 455 
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for purposes of illustrating some of the various aspects of 
income tax avoidance donations tax and section 7 provisions 
were designed to thwart. 
Example 
3 . 1 Consider a married taxpayer - or married person as 
defined in section 1 of the Act - with 2 children and 
a taxable income of Rl75 000. 
follows: 
His income tax is as 
Tax on R75 000 
Tax on Rl00 000 (43% marginal rate) 





3.2 Now suppose that he sets up a trust in favour of his 
wife and two children as beneficiaries with some of 
his capital, which has the effect of reducing the 
income coming direct to him by Rl00 000; which sum now 





- C R33 000 
3.3 Assuming A,B, and C receive no other income and that 
they have no deductions to claim against income for 
tax purposes, they would be assessed as follows: 
Due by A R 7 390 
B R 5 980 
C R 5 980 




3.4 The resulting tax saved is as follows 
Total tax without trust R63 000 
Due by taxpayer 20 175 
Due by beneficiaries 






It must be noted however, that the saving of R23 650 would 
hold only prior to_ the introduction of donations tax and 
after the 1991 amendment of the section of the Act that 
deemed the income of the wife to be that of the husband and 
before the introduction of section 7 (2) . I will now 
consider the effects of all these provisions on the example 
given above and what, if anything, actually remains of the 
tax saving. 
4. DONATIONS TAX EFFECT 
Let us assume the taxpayer donated property to the value of 
Rl million to the trust, which earned the income of Rl00 
000 which was distributed to A, B and C in the above 
example . 
Now in terms of section 56(1) (b) of the Act, property 
donated for the benefit of the donor's spouse is exempt 
from donations tax. Therefore we may take it that of the 
R 1 million only R660 000 will be subject to the tax. A 
further exemption is provided by subsection (2) (b) of 
section 56 which exempts from tax amounts up to R20 000, 
which means that of the remaining R660 000 only R640 000 
will be subject to tax at 15%. This results in donations 
tax due by taxpayer of R96 000. 
However, even as a once-off payment, I think donations tax 
of R96 000 could prove too heavy a price to pay up-front 
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for an annual saving of R23 650. But surely there must be 
a way out of the donations tax bind? 
The solution lies in removing the element of donation, or 
all talk of donation, from the fund or property 
establishing the trust. Thus the R96 000 donations tax can 
be avoided by the taxpayer by selling to the trust the 
property concerned for its full market value of Rl 
million30 • The trust, for its side of the bargain, being 
without the means of paying, will create a loan account 
with the taxpayer as creditor. That being the case, 
donations tax will not affect the R23 650 savings. 
5. SECTION 7 ANTI-AVOIDANCE MEASURES 
These are section 7(2) affecting spouses of taxpayers as 
beneficiaries, section 7 (3) affecting minor children of 
taxpayers as beneficiaries, section 7(4) proscribing cross-
donations in avoidance of section 7(3), and sections 7(5) 
and 7 ( 6) affecting donors with retained powers in the 
control of trust property. 
5.1 WIFE BENEFICIARY AND SECTION 7(2) 
The R34 000 given as the income of the wife from the 
trust 31 would be taxed in the hands of the taxpayer in 
terms of section 7(2) which provides that 
Income received by or accrued to one spouse (recipient) 
is deemed to be the other spouse's income if the income was 
derived in consequence of a donation settlement or other 
disposition made by the donor on or after 20 March 1991. 
30 
31 
Avoidance scheme suggested by Prof. Emslie in lectures 
at UCT 
see 3.2 of example under E3 supra 
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The significance of 20 March 1991 in the section is that 
after that date married women began to be taxed separately 
from their husbands, whereas before then, as already 
mentioned above, the income of a married woman was deemed 
to be that of her husband and was taxed in his hands. 
Therefore, before that date a wife's receipts or accruals 
from a trust set up by her husband as donor would have had 
no tax significance because the husband would have been 
taxed on such receipts or accruals in the normal way. 
However, the amendment of the law in 1991 to allow separate 
assessments introduced tax-avoidance opportunities for 
high-income husbands or wives to divert their incomes to 
their wives or husbands via trusts. And that is precisely 
what section 7(2) (a) seeks to prevent. I now turn to look 
closely at the section to see how it affects the saving of 
R23 650 in the example. 
5 .1.1 DONATION, SETTLEMENT OR OTHER DISPOSITION 
Before considering the practical application of section 
7(2) I shall briefly examine the phrase, "donation, 
settlement or other disposition" which runs through almost 
all section 7 provisions. 
"Donation" has the meaning contained in section 55 (1) in 
relation to donations tax - a common law meaning referring 
to disposal of property for no consideration. 
11 Settlement II is a term less frequently encountered but 
refers to a gratuitous disposal of property II subject to 
specific terms and conditions, usually to the trustees of 
t1 a trust 1132 
32 Huxham and Haupt 519 
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In ovenstone33 it was held that the words "other 
disposition" should be interpreted eiusdem generis with 
"donation" and "settlement" such that the whole phrase 
should be read as "donation, settlement or other similar 
disposition". 
"any donation, settlement or other 
disposition ... also covers any disposal of 
property made under a settlement or other 
disposition for some consideration but in 
which there is an appreciable element of 
gratuitousness and liberality or 
generosity" 34 ••• 
It must be noted, however, that although ovenstone is 
applicable as to the meaning of "other disposition", the 
decision itself was with respect to circumstances covered 
by section 7(3) whose wording is similar to section 7(2) in 
common respects. Also where section 7(2) speaks of "in 
consequence of ", section 7 ( 3) speaks of "by reason of, " 
both of which have a similar import of apportionment 35 • 
The section 7(2) groundwork having been laid, so to speak, 
I now go on to address the problem posed by the section in 
the example in relation to the taxpayer's wife's income 
from the trust. 
5 .1. 2 EFFECT OF SECTION 7(2) ON WIFE'S INCOME 
I now look at the effect of section 7 (2) on the wife's 
income from the trust and in doing so I will continue with 
the assumption of apportionability, and that is that the 
33 Ovenstone v. SIR 
34 Ovenstone ibid 740 
35 see below 
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wife's income amounting to R34 000 is attributable to her 
R340 000 share of the property put into the trust by her 
husband. With regard to this amount there are two possible 
scenarios: where it is put into the trust as an outright 
donation and where it is put as a loan. 
Where the R340 000 was given to trust as a donation then 
the income concerned, ie R34 000, is taxable in the hands 
of the taxpayer (husband) in terms of section 7(2) (a) as 
already mentioned. As a result the taxpayer will be 
required to pay R34 000 x 43% or Rl4 620 in addition to the 
R20 17536 due by him. This amounts to an overall tax 
increase of R7 230 which we obtain by subtracting the 
amount of tax the wife would pay were section 7(2) (a) in-
operative from the additional tax due by the taxpayer 
because of the operation of the section (that is Rl4 620 
less R7 390). This in turn reduces the tax saving of R23 
650 to Rl6 420. 
On the other hand, where the amount was given as a loan 
there are three possibilities: it was given interest-free, 
or it was given as a soft loan at below market rate of 
interest, or it was given at the going market rate. 
In the case involving a loan at market rate section 7(2) (a) 
would not apply because of the absence of gratuity or 
liberality or generosity in the transaction. Thus all 
things being equal, the tax saving of R23 650 would not.be 
affected. However, in the case of no-interest or below 
market-interest loan, an element of gratuity is involved in 
terms of Ovenstone and thus section 7(2) would apply as 
shown below. 
11 Now where the consideration, while not being due 
consideration, is nevertheless appreciable, it will 
36 See E3.l Supra 
mean that the income in question under section 7(3) 
will usually have accrued or been received by reason 
of both elements of gratuitousness and consideration. 
I see no reason why in those circumstances the income 
should not then be apportioned, between the two 
elements. The words, 'by reason of', themselves 
suggest some apportionment in order to give proper 
effect to the real cause of the accrual or receipt of 
the income" 3 7 • 
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Suppose the market rate of interest is 8%. In that case an 
interest-free loan of R340 000 amounts to a gift-over or 
"other disposition" of R27 000. Since the income from the 
trust works out at 10% of capital, the element of income 
derived "in consequence of" the R27 000 "other disposition" 
amounts to 10% interest which is R2 720. And that is the 
amount taxable in the hands of the taxpayer in terms of 
section 7 (2) (a). This results in additional tax of R191 
which reduces the tax saving of R23 650. Details of the 
calculation are as follows:-
37 
Wifes income ex trust 
Taxable in taxpayers hands 
Tax due by wife 
Tax due by taxpayer (2 720 x 43%) 
Total tax due 
Wifes tax without section 7(2) (a) 
Additional tax 












The effects of section 7 (2) (a) in the case where the 
element of gratuity is an interest charge of less than 8% 
can be found in a way similar to the above. 
I'm afraid we seem to have got lost in some maze of detail 
which is nevertheless essential for a full explanation of 
the effects not only of section 7 ( 2) but also of other 
section 7 provisions including section 7(3), which I 
consider next in the context of our example - now in 
relation to B and C. 38 • 
5.2 CHILD BENEFICIARIES AND SECTION 7(3) 
I 
rjaw look at the provisions of the Act affecting the 
raxation of income received by or accrued to children of 
}the taxpayer from a trust set up with funds donated by him. 
I 
· The provisions concerned are contained in section 7 ( 3) 
which provides that: 
"Income shall be deemed to have been received by the 
parent of any minor child, if by reason of any 
donation, settlement or other disposition made by that 
parent of that child -
(a) It has been received by or has accrued to or in 
favour of that child or has been expended for the 
maintenance, education or benefit; or 
(b) it has been accumulated for the benefit of that 
child" 
Al though the essential elements of the thread running 
through most section 7 provisions including the words, "by 
reason of" have been dealt with under the discussion of 
38 See E3.2 above 
• 
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section 7(2) above, some case law must be considered in the 
specific context of section 7(3) regarding these very 
words. 
"Difficulty is often experienced in deciding whether 
or not income received by children is "by reason of" 
a donati2n made by the parent. The difficulty arises 
where one is faced with so-called income on income, ie 
the income which accrues from the re-investment of the 
income from donation" (Huxham and Haupt 520) 
In Kohler V CIR the father had donated Rl0 000 to each of 
his daughters. The income from the investment was used to 
purchase shares which yielded dividends. It was held that 
the proximate cause of the dividends was the income from 
the investment and not the investment itself, which was the 
remote cause and that, "once income has accrued to or been 
received by the minor and has been capitalized, its 
subsequent earning or product is attributed not to the 
source from which the original income was derived but to 
the advantageous employment of the minor's new capital". 
In CIR v Widan, however, without overruling Kohler, it was 
held that · where the original donation was intended to 
produce income which would be used to acquire shares, the 
resultant dividend was by reason of the donation. 
Having made those remarks, we see that in term~ of section 
7(3) the taxpayer will be liable to tax on the R66 000 if 
B and C are minor children in example E3 above. Major 
children would be taxed in their own hands as is assumed in , 
the example. Now, if, because of section 7 ( 3) , the 
taxpayer can derive no tax advantage via the trust 
mechanism in respect of minor children, what advantage 
would there be in creating a similar trust in respect of 
major children who are likely to be self-supporting anyway? 
The answer lies in the avoidance of estate duty which is 
34 
not really our concern here but 
nonetheless. 
is of interest, 
In terms of the Estate Duty Act estate duty is payable at 
15% of net value of deceased estate in excess of Rl 
million. It would, therefore, seem to be logical that the 
taxpayer should either donate his estate to his children 
during his life time or set up an intervivos trust in their 
favour instead of bequeathing to them a dutiable .estate. 
However, donations tax, both in case of a direct donation 
to the children and in case of a donation to the trust, 
would render the exercise futile 39 unless the loan trick of 
E4 above is resorted to. 
5.3 AVOIDANCE BY MEANS OF CROSS-DONATIONS 
Taxpayer X with child. D and taxpayer Y with child E could 
together work out a scheme to obviate the problem of 
section 7(3), whereby X denotes funds to trust YE in favour 
of E and Y reciprocates by donating an equal sum to trust 
XD in favour of D, where D and E are minors. Under such a 
"reciprocal" scheme or cross-donations the R66 000 trust 
income in favour of Band C, the minor children of the 
taxpayer in example E3, could be taxed in their hands. 
However, I have my own doubts if such obviously "abnormal" 
"I give you x you give me x" scheme would escape the net of 
the general anti-avoidance provisions of section 103(1) of 
the Act. But just in case it did, there is section 7(4) to 
catch it. The latter section provides as follows. 
"any income received by or accrued to or in favour of 
any minor child of any person, by reason of any 
donation, settlement or other disposition made by any 
other person, shall be deemed to be the income of the 
39 In fact in view of the Rl million rebate, payment of 
estate duty would make better sense 
• 
parent of such minor child, if such parent or his 
spouse has made a donation, settlement or other 
disposition or given some other consideration in 
favour directly or indirectly of the said other 
person or his family". 
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Specifically in view of section 7 (4) and also, I think, 
more generally in view of section 103(1), a successful way 
of avoiding sect ion 7 ( 3) could be by way of a "granny 
trust". 
The wording of section 7(3) does not prevent a grandparent 
from setting up a trust in favour of his minor grandchild""-
such that the income accruing to the grandchild from the 
trust is taxable in the grandchild's hands. Where such 
grandparent is obliged to support his minor grandchildren 
and does so, which is not uncommon, and is a high-income 
earner, setting up such a trust would make a lot of sense 
for him. However where the grandparent does not support 
his grandc~ildren and is not obliged to do so, he would not 
go to the trouble of setting up a trust for the benefit of 
the grandchildren unless they were his heirs and he wanted 
to avoid estate duty or there was some quid pro quo. If, 
however, such quid pro quo took the form of a cross-
donation or some other "abnormal" tax-avoidance scheme, it 
would fall foul of section 7(4) or section 103(1). 
From now on I took at a class of anti-avoidance provisions 
slightly different from what has been considered so far. 
Thus I will not refer very often, if at all, tq__ the example 
of E3 as I have been doing so far. Where neces~r'Y-.. ad hoc 
illustrations will be used. ~ 
5.4 AVOIDANCE BY POSTPONEMENT: SECTION 7(5) 
One other possible way of 










in which distribution to 
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the discretionary trust 
beneficiary is delayed. However, where the beneficiary has 
no immediate vested right to the income, then the income is 
taxable in the hands of the trust immediately it accrues or 
is received in terms of section 25B(l) discussed under C 
above. In my opinion the only worthwhile postponement 
would be where the income is taxable neither in the hands 
of the donor nor those of the trust while vesting in the 
beneficiary is held in abeyance. 
This may be one of the instances illustrated in the 
following passage. 
"sometimes it happens that beneficiaries are 
specified in a 
legally obliged 
trust deed, but the trustees 




beneficiaries nominated by them in the exercise of a 
discretionary power conferred upon them by the deed. 
In such circumstances, the income is regarded as 
having been received by the beneficiaries so 
nominated. 1140 
My understanding of this statement is that the trust will 
not be taxed on the income it receives during year one, 
say, but only the beneficiaries after having been 
designated during year three, say. However I don't think 
this is possible in South African law, for, even if the 
trust were not immediately taxed on the income in terms of 
section 25B (1) - which is unlikely - the donor himself 
would be taxed in terms of section 7 ( 5) which provides 
that: 
"if any person has made any donation, settlement or 
other disposition which is subject to a stipulation or 
condition, whether made or imposed by such person or 
40 Riseborough 3 
anybody else, to the effect that the beneficiaries 
thereof or some of them shall not receive the income 
or some portion of the income thereunder until the 
happening of some event, whether fixed or contingent, 
so much of any income as would, but for such 
stipulation or condition, in consequence of the 
donation, settlement or other disposition be received 
by or accrue to or in favour of the beneficiaries, 
shall, until the happening of that event or the 
death of that person, whichever first takes place, be 
deemed to be the income of that person". 
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However, before proceeding to consider section 7(5) I may 
mention in passing that in the absence of the possibility 
of total suspension of the incidence of tax until the 
trustees have exercised their discretion, retention of the 
income in the trust and the taxability of the income in the 
hands of the trust, in itself offers a measure of tax 
avoidance. For, as Broomberg observes: 
II It stands to reason that it will often be 
advantageous for income to be trapped in a trust, and 
be subjected to tax in the hands of the trustee, 
rather than to suffer tax at maximum rates in the 
hands of the settlor or beneficiary of the trust" 41 • 
However, Broomberg goes on to say that section 7(5) was 
"designed to prevent this happening" 42 - ie the trapping of 
income in the trust and the taxation of the trust itself 
instead of the settlor or beneficiary? With respect, I 
don't think that was the purpose of section 7(5); rather it 





"where and so long as the donor does not permit the 
beneficiary of the gift to enjoy immediately the 
income derived therefrom by deeming the income in 
question to be that of the donor" 43 • 
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This is different from the case where income is trapped in 
a trust wherein the trustees have a discretion to award it 
to the beneficiaries and the income remains so trapped 
simply because such discretion has not yet been exercised 
by the trustees. In that case section 25B(l) would apply 
to tax the trust and not section 7(5) to tax the donor. 
As far as 
requirements 
section 7(5) is concerned there are 
for the application of its provisions, 
two 
and 
these are as follows 44 • 
5.4.1 
5.4.2 
A stipulation the effect of which is that the 
beneficiaries shall not receive the income until 
the happening of a certain event (eg attainment 
of age 25); and 
but for the stipulation the income would be 
received by or accrue to the beneficiaries. 
The stipulation of age 25 given as an example in the first 
requirement gives rise to a contingent right in case of an 
18 year old, say, such that he would not immediately be 
entitled to the income, it being conditional upon his 
attaining the age of 25. Now, given the present age of the 
beneficiary as 18, what is the effect of the second 
requirement, or alternatively what is its interpretation? 







Suppose donor x sets up a trust stipulating the attainment 
of age 25 before income could vest in his grandson y, the 
beneficiary of/ the trust, who is now aged 18. Suppose 
also that income amounting to R50 000 accrues to the trust 
- at least in terms of the trust deed - now. 
The question is, what will make the R50. 000 "accrue" to y 
now and not in 7 years time? And, more important, would the 
R50 000 have accrued to y now but for the age 25 
stipulation, such that x becomes immediately taxable in 
terms of section 7(5)? 
In Estate Dempers where the facts were similar in essential 
respects, the answer to the last question in the example 
was held to be yes. And it was further stated that, 
II 
the 
the application of the devolutionary portion of 
subsection ( 5. 42) involves a hypothetical, 
notional enquiry which cannot be directed solely to 
questions such as whether the beneficiaries' right to 
income is vested or contingent. The question which the 
court must ask itself is whether, in the absence of 
the stipulation withholding trust income, this income 
would have been received by or have accrued to the 
beneficiary. In answering this question regard must be 
had to the terms of the instrument generally, the 
donor's benevolent intention, as evinced by the terms 
of the instrument and all the relevant circumstances." 
So, according to this decision, never mind the effect of 
the stipulation (whether there is immediate vesting or 
vesting after 7 years). Simply ignore it and decide what 
the position would be were the stipulation not in place. 
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In the circumstances of the example used for illustration, 
there would be immediate vesting in the beneficiary. Ergo 
the donor is liable in terms of section 7(5). 
There is one other aspect of section 7(5) that is in need 
of clarification and that is, whether the exercise by the 
trustees of their discretion under circumstances provided 
for by the section is an "event" in terms of that section. 
That question has not yet been decided by the courts. 
However, in my opinion, such exercise of discretion would 
constitute such event. The object of the section is to tax 
in the hands of the donor what for the time being can't be 
taxed in the hands of the beneficiary because of -lack of 
vesting in the latter by reason of the farmer's 
stipulation. And if such stipulation is coupled with a 
discretion given the trustees, which discretion has the 
effect of continuing and sustaining the prohibition of 
vesting, it will only be after the trustees have exercised 
their discretion that the stipulation "package" ceases to 
be effective and the beneficiary will have a vested right 
and the need to substitute the donor for tax purposes will 
fall away. Therefore, the exercise by the trustees of 
their discretion would under the circumstances constitute 
an event as contemplated by section 7(5). This should mean 
then that, the incidence of tax would continue to be on the 
donor until such time as the trustees have exercised their 
discretion. 
Example 
An example of a "stipulation package" could be as follows: 
"The beneficiary shall not be entitled to receive the 
income until he has attained the age of 25 and the 
trustees have exercised their discretion to give it to 
him 11 -. 
• 
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So, when the trustees finally exercise their discretion on 
the beneficiary's 27th birthday, say, and decide to give 
him the money then, that decision would constitute an 
event. 
If, on the other hand, that decision does not constitute an 
event in terms of section 7(5), we would have the following 
incidences of tax: 
During the period up to (but excluding) the time the 
beneficiary turns 25, the incidence of tax would be on the 
donor in terms of section 7(5) - the 25th birthday being 
the event. 
During the two year period beginning with the beneficiary's 
25th birthday up to the time the trustees exercise their 
discretion, the incidence would be on the trust in terms of 
section 25B(l) as an ordinary discretionary trust. 
Clearly the interpretation of the exercise of the trustees' 
discretion as a "non-event" in the example would be 
favourable to the donor taxpayer. 45 In that case the court 
might be inclined to decide contra fiscum should it be 
called upon to decide the matter and should it find section 
7(5) not incapable of such interpretation46 • However, until 
such time as the matter has been decided by the court one 
can only speculate as to whether or not the trustees 
decision under the circumstances illustrated is an event in 
terms of section 7(5). 
This very nearly brings us to the end of our discussion and 
only the last section in the series remains and that is 
section 7(6) which I propose to consider under the rubric: 
avoidance by "Flexibility". 
45 
46 
See reference to note 41 above 




5.5 AVOIDANCE BY "FLEXIBILITY" SECTION 7(6) 
Huxham and Haupt give an example of a donor who may seek to 
avoid tax by setting up a trust with a deed giving him 
power to vary beneficiaries at will. According to the 
authors: 
"It would be a simple matter to establish from year to 
ye~r which of the beneficiaries had the lowest 
marginal rate of tax and to direct that the income 
accruing to the trust should be paid to that 
particular benef iciary" 47 • 
The authors give this as an example of tax avoidance specifically 
countered by section 7(6) But in my opinion the donor could 
achieve the same result by circumventing section 7(6) and 
creating a discretionary trust with the power to appoint and 
dismiss or to vary beneficiaries being conferred upon the 
trustees with no power reposing upon himself. For section 7(6) 
provides that, 
"If any deed of· donation, settlement or other 
disposition contains a stipulation that the right to 
receive any income thereby conferred may, under powers 
retained by the person by whom that right is 
conferred, be revoked or conferred upon another, so 
much of any income as in consequence of the donation, 
settlement or other disposition is received by or 
accrues to or in favour of the person on whom the 
right is conferred, shall be deemed to be the income 
of the person by whom it is conferred, so long as he 
retains those powers". 
However, I must point out that substituting the powers of 
trustees for those of the donor himself, while obviating the 
47 Huxham and Haupt 523 
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pitfalls of section 7(6), might not suit the purpose of the donor 
unless the trustees would exercise no independent discretion but 
would merely carry out the bidding of the donor, which would be 
legally untenable. Having said that, let me nonetheless make the 
general observation that actually what is usually involved in 
secti~ns 7(6) and 7(5) schemes is more the avoidance of estate 
duty than income tax. 
This is done via a reluctant or half-hearted making over of 
assets and divestment of dominium and control from donor to 
trust. Effective power and control, which are inherent in the 
right of ownership, continue to be enjoyed by the donor under the 
convenient trappings of a trust. However, if such a trust is 
recognised as such for estate duty purposes, then its assets will 
not be subject to estate· duty as part of the deceased donor's 
estate even though the deceased will have enjoyed considerable 
powers of control over the assets of the trust prior to his 
death. If, on the other hand, the deceased donor's powers were 
such that he could have disposed of the assets of the trust for 
his own benefit, then Estate Duty Act's own anti-avoidance 
provisions of section 3(3) (d) would come into play and deem the 
assets concerned to be part of the deceased donor's estate and 
thus dutiable. Regardless of the eventual estate duty position 
of the trust assets, section 7(6) is a means of getting an income 
• tax cut of the revenue from the trust during the reluctant 
donor's life time. 
5.6 "ODD MAN OUT" SECTION 7(1) 
Section 7(1) is oddman out in the section 7 provisions in that 
it does not refer to the distinctive refrain of "donation 
settlement or other disposition". However, in view of the fact 
that it deems income which has vested in a person to have accrued 
to him and immediately taxable in his hands even if he has not 
yet received it, it belongs to the group of provisions that 
prevent possible postponement of liability for trust income and 
hence prevent avoidance by postponing payment of tax. The 
• 
• 
subsection provides that: 
"Income shall be deemed to have accrued to a person 
notwithstanding that such income has been invested, 
accumulated or otherwise capitalised by him or that 
such income has not been actually paid over to him but 
remains due and payable to him or has been credited in 
account or re-invested or accumulated or capitalised 
or· otherwise dealt with in his name or on his behalf, 
and a complete statement of all such income shall be 
included by any person in the returns rendered by him 
under this Act" . 
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This brings us to the end not only of the part dealing with anti-
avoidance provisions specific to trusts but also of our 
discussion as a whole. In the conclusion I shall briefly look 
at prospects in the light of the current tax debate. 
CONCLUSION 
The longest part of the discussion has been that dealing with 
specific anti-avoidance provisions for the simple reason that 
these contain a sizeable body of law both statute and case law 
and involve many fundamental issues. This is evidence of the 
legislature's awareness of the potential use to which the trust 
may be put as a tax-avoidance device in "abnormal" arrangements, 
and shows its determination to minimise the chances of success 
for such schemes by deploying a formidable array of special 
provisions in addition to the ''catch-all" provisions of section 
103 (1) . 
However, just as it is concerned with closing revenue leaks, the 
lawgiver is also concerned with widening the tax base and 
increasing revenue intake whenever fiscal or social 
considerations demand. Indeed, on the eve of the new South 
Africa, the ANC, widely tipped to be the next government, has 
45 
unveiled its Reconstruction and Development Programme amid 
endless rumours of all manner of new taxes. 
Thus "more interesting times" might be in store for trusts as the 
new government might decide trusts are for "fat cats" and close 
the tax avoidance opportunities discussed under part Dor levy 
a higher tax on them. A movement precisely in the latter 
direction could well have been presaged by the Margo Commission 
when it recommended that trust income should be taxed at maximum 
marginal rate should the trustees fail to distribute it to the 
beneficiaries when it is within their power to do so48 • 
Should these tax pressures materialise we could expect to see a 
decline in the use of trusts in favour of CC's in general and in 
the area of estate planning in particular, taking into account 
the additional factor of high administrative costs of trusts 
compared to CC' s 49 • 
48 Margo Commission Report paragraph 11.56-7 
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PERSONS OTHER THAN COMPANIES 
FOR THE YEAR OF ASSESSMENT ENDING 28 FEBRUARY 1993 
(OR 30 JUNE 1993) 
Normal Tax 
(Before the deduction of rebates) 
Tax Rates 
MARRIED PERSONS' UNMARRIED PERSONS' 
Taxable 
Tax income 
R R R R R 
17% of each Rl 0- 5 000 17% of each Rl 
Tax 
850 + 18% of the amount over 5 000 5 000-10 000 850 + 19% of the amount over 
1 750 + 19% • n n n 10 000 10 000-15 000 1 800 + 21% • n n 
2 700 + 20% • n n n 15 000 15 000-20 000 2 850 + 24% • n n 
3 700 + 21\ II n n II 20 000 20 000-30 000 4 050 + 28\ II II II 
5 800 + 28% • II n n 30 000 30 000-40 000 6 850 + 36% • n n 
8 600 + 36%" n n n 40 000 40 000-50 000 10 450 + 41%" n n 
12 200 + 41%" n n n 50 000 50 000-56 000 14 550 + 42% • n n 
16 300 + 42\ II II II II 60 000 56 000+ 17 070 + 43\ II II II 





R R R R 
0- 5 000 17% of each Rl 
5 000-10 000 850 + 19% of the amount over 5 000 
10 000-15 000 1 800 + 21% • n n n 10 000 
15 000-20 000 2 850 + 24% • n n n 15 000 
20 000-30 000 4 050 + 28% • II 20 000 
30 000-40 000 6 850 + 36% • n n 30 000 
40 000-50 000 10 450 + 38% • n n n 40 000 
50 000+ 14 250 + 40%" n n 50 000 
A married person is : 
(a) a man who during any portion of the period of assessment was married and not 
living· apart from his wife in circumstances which, in the opinion of the 
Commissioner, indicate that the separation is likely to be permanent; or 
(b) a widow or widower; or 
(cl a person who is entitled to a child rebate. 
Adapted from Meyerowitz 
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